Mr. Madison’s War: Politics, Diplomacy, and Warfare in the Early American Republic, 1783-1830
J.C.A. Stagg, 1983
This is an interesting period, and it seems there are several interesting stories waiting to be told about it. In Mr. Madison’s War, J.C.A. Stagg admitted that the dominant feature of almost all literature” on the War of 1812 “has been its emphasis on the sheer ineptitude of the American war effort.” But even so, “to stress ineptitude as the theme of the War of 1812...is to neglect an important, albeit obvious, point about its history -- which is that no administration could have actually intended what happened to have occurred.” In that case, the question is, was there a realistic plan behind James Madison’s policy, or was he too a source of incompetence? “The incompetence that seemed all-pervasive during the war years was more than simply the failings of so many individuals; rather it was symptomatic of political and administrative problems deeply rooted in the government of American society. Yet the founding fathers, including Madison himself, had justified the introduction of a new constitution in 1789 very much on the grounds that it would provide the United States with a more efficient system of government and prevent a recurrence of the disorder that had characterized the War for Independence.” This is an interesting point, because it suggests that the founders were particularly concerned about facilitating a united military, in expectation of future wars with Britain. And because it suggests a profound lack of concern with what the American people actually wanted, both in the minds of the founders and of Professor Stagg.
At the end of his introduction, Stagg also seemed to admit that the war didn’t really resolve anything. Nor did “the sudden rise of Anglo-American ‘friendship’ after 1815.” The real change in British-American relations was brought about by neither Britons nor Americans, but by a change in the global balance of power created by “the emancipation of Latin America.” So in that sense, a study of politics and American foreign policy between the end of the Revolution and the Monroe Doctrine that doesn’t say another word about Spanish American independence, seems fatally myopic.
Madison’s decision for war is hard to see as sensible. When it declared war on Great Britain, the U.S. “could command little more than six thousand regular troops and a naval force consisting of sixteen vessels of all sizes.” In contrast, the British controlled the seas with “six hundred vessels in active service while also supporting a regular army at home and abroad that totaled nearly one quarter of a million men.” Stagg said Madison believed America could easily take a large part of Canada and that this would bring Britain to the negotiating table. But in 1812 his Jeffersonian political allies seem to have been on the same page: “The best-known statement of American optimism about the ease of seizing Canada was Thomas Jefferson’s claim that ‘the acquisition of Canada...as far as the neighborhood of Quebec will be a mere matter of marching’.” The critical issue was denying Britain access to raw materials it needed in order to maintain its West Indian colonies and its navy. Around 1806 Napoleon had cut off the supply of Baltic timber to the Royal Navy, which had really kick-started the Canadian lumber industry. “The growth of Upper Canada was a significant step toward freeing the British empire from the effects of American economic restrictions.” Canada, as an alternative source of nearly everything supplied by the U.S. and as a market for British manufactures, had to be neutralized. Ironically, an American diplomat in the West Indies in 1827-8 reported, “the inhabitants of this island Barbados as well as the others, have less regard for Mr. Jefferson than any of our Presidents (not excepting Mr. Madison), yet they say he nevertheless, though not intentionally, rendered them a great service by laying on the Embargo, which taught them to find resources within themselves, that is to say, by cultivating ground provisions, which they never did before, and were entirely dependent on the United States” (quoting a letter from Robert Monroe Harrison to Henry Clay).
It’s interesting that “the growth of Canada was also stimulated by, and in turn contributed to, the growth of the United States...and the settlers in this northeastern region were as likely to cross into Canada in search of new prosperity as they were to remain in the United States” (citing Lambert, Travels through Lower Canada and the United States, 1813). There’s probably a story there, about people moving north and south across the national border in this period. Another interesting point that Stagg mentioned several times but didn’t develop, was the government’s apparent difficulty raising troops. Despite the fact that “the society of the early Republic greatly esteemed the virtuous citizen who willingly assumed public duties in a selfless, disinterested manner, recruiting in the northeast and northwest was hampered by men’s loyalty to their regions (and regional militia) in preference to national army service. Troop levies in the northwest were “hampered by a series of petty obstructions, usually arising from attempts to use writs of habeus corpus to get men discharged on a variety of grounds, mainly wrongful enlistment.” This is another story, especially in light of the government’s claims that one of the “popular” reasons for war was British impressment of American seamen.
A final dramatic moment (amidst several hundred pages of really dry political history) comes on January 5th 1815, when the Hartford Convention convened to discuss possible New England secession. An observer warned Monroe that they “would have to be crushed immediately. If the rebellious New England states were given time to organize an effective government, he believed they could, by virtue of their large populations and well-equipped militias, successfully ‘bid defiance’ to the Union, seize all the property of the federal government, and perhaps enter into an alliance with Britain. Monroe took the advice to heart. He increased the guard on the Springfield armory and on January 10 authorized New York Republican leaders...to draw on more money and volunteers to crush a rebellion or an invasion.” Another story to pursue here, about regional interests, force, and national union.
I should note here, as a Canadian historian, that Canada as such did not exist under that name officially until 1867. In Madison's time, it existed as the independent colonies of Upper and Lower Canada (now, respectively, Ontario and Quebec), New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island.
We spent a lot of money commemorating the bicentennial of the War, for one thing. I don't know if Americans did the same.
Some more ignorant Canadians like to joke that "we" were the ones who burned down the White House during a raid on Washington. Our inferiority complex vis-a-vis you at work. But this is wrong: there might have been the odd Canadian in the British troops that did that, but it wasn't exclusively Canada.